skill-finder

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the skills package from the npm registry using npx and fetches SKILL.md files from arbitrary GitHub repositories via raw.githubusercontent.com. While GitHub is a well-known service, the specific repositories being accessed are determined at runtime by search results.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes multiple shell commands to manage the skill lifecycle, including npx for search, curl for downloading content, mkdir for directory creation, and ln -sfn for creating symbolic links in the agent's configuration directories.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Facilitates the installation of external code into the agent's runtime environment. By symlinking downloaded GitHub repository content into ~/.claude/skills/ or ~/.codex/skills/, the skill enables third-party instructions to be loaded and executed by the agent in subsequent sessions without further verification.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Deep Evaluation' step involves the agent fetching and parsing arbitrary markdown content from external GitHub repositories. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where a malicious skill author could include instructions designed to deceive the agent during the evaluation and recommendation process.
  • [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill explicitly modifies the agent's local environment by creating persistent symlinks in the configuration directories. This ensures that any downloaded skill—potentially including malicious ones—remains active across sessions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 04:21 PM