skill-finder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
skillspackage from the npm registry usingnpxand fetchesSKILL.mdfiles from arbitrary GitHub repositories viaraw.githubusercontent.com. While GitHub is a well-known service, the specific repositories being accessed are determined at runtime by search results. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes multiple shell commands to manage the skill lifecycle, including
npxfor search,curlfor downloading content,mkdirfor directory creation, andln -sfnfor creating symbolic links in the agent's configuration directories. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Facilitates the installation of external code into the agent's runtime environment. By symlinking downloaded GitHub repository content into
~/.claude/skills/or~/.codex/skills/, the skill enables third-party instructions to be loaded and executed by the agent in subsequent sessions without further verification. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Deep Evaluation' step involves the agent fetching and parsing arbitrary markdown content from external GitHub repositories. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where a malicious skill author could include instructions designed to deceive the agent during the evaluation and recommendation process.
- [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill explicitly modifies the agent's local environment by creating persistent symlinks in the configuration directories. This ensures that any downloaded skill—potentially including malicious ones—remains active across sessions.
Audit Metadata