skills/fearovex/claude-config/sdd-ff/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sdd-ff

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dynamic resolution algorithm for sub-agent definitions, prioritizing project-local files (.claude/skills/ and openspec/config.yaml) over global configurations. In an untrusted project environment, an attacker could supply malicious SKILL.md files that the orchestrator will resolve and load. The orchestrator explicitly instructs the sub-agents to follow these external instructions exactly, allowing for full hijacking of the sub-agent's logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Context extraction' logic creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by parsing user input and writing the results into a shared artifact.
  • Ingestion points: The $ARGUMENTS variable containing the user's description (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None are applied to the extracted content when writing to the proposal.md skeleton (SKILL.md).
  • Capability inventory: Subsequent sub-agents (propose, spec, design, tasks) have broad capabilities to read and modify project files, specifications, and design documents (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the extracted strings before they are interpolated into the proposal file (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 11:24 AM