openai-responses
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill provides templates designed to process untrusted external data using models with high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion Points: In
templates/cloudflare-worker.ts, thefetchhandler extractsinputdirectly from a POST request body. Intemplates/code-interpreter.ts, user-provided JSON data is interpolated into prompts. Intemplates/file-search.ts, external files are uploaded and searched. - Boundary Markers: Absent. Untrusted inputs are passed directly to the model without delimiters (e.g., XML tags) or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability Inventory: The templates enable
code_interpreter(server-side Python execution),web_search(network access), andmcp(connection to external APIs like Stripe). - Sanitization: None. The code contains no validation or escaping logic for the data processed by the LLM.
- Data Exposure & Network Operations (LOW): The skill performs legitimate network operations to
api.openai.comand developer-defined MCP server URLs. Intemplates/image-generation.ts, the code downloads an image from a remote URL and writes it to the local file system (./generated-image.png), which is a restricted file-write operation. - Unverifiable Dependencies (LOW): The project relies on standard Node.js packages including
openai,tsx, andwrangler. No malicious or suspicious dependencies were detected. The scriptscripts/check-versions.shusesnpm viewto fetch version metadata, which is a safe operation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata