gptq
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent or user to execute shell commands to manage the Python environment and system dependencies.
- Evidence: Multiple instances of
pip installfor packages likeauto-gptq,transformers, andaccelerateinSKILL.mdandreferences/troubleshooting.md. - Evidence: Instruction to use
sudo apt-get install python3-devinreferences/troubleshooting.mdto install system development headers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves software, models, and data from various external repositories and services.
- Evidence: Fetches pre-quantized models from Hugging Face (e.g.,
TheBloke/Llama-2-7B-Chat-GPTQ) and datasets (e.g.,c4,bigcode/the-stack,ShareGPT). - Evidence: References a custom index for Python wheels at
huggingface.github.io. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to load and process data from external, untrusted datasets, which could potentially contain malicious content aimed at influencing the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
datasets.load_datasetinSKILL.mdandreferences/calibration.mdto ingest text from public datasets for model calibration. - Boundary markers: The code examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to treat the calibration text as non-executable data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
model.generateandmodel.quantize, both of which process the external data directly. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the text content within the ingested datasets is documented in the provided implementation examples.
Audit Metadata