coding-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for running tools in non-sandboxed modes. It promotes the use of the
--yoloflag for the Codex CLI, which is described as having 'NO sandbox, NO approvals'. It also documents anelevated: trueparameter for the bash tool, which would allow code to run directly on the host system rather than in a restricted environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data via
git cloneandgh pr checkoutto review pull requests. - Ingestion points: External Git repositories and GitHub Pull Requests (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within the code or PR descriptions are provided.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the full
bashtool, file system write access, and the ability to execute additional sub-agents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the installation and execution of external packages and code, such as
@mariozechner/pi-coding-agentvianpm install, and cloning arbitrary repositories from GitHub for review and modification.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata