skills/firecrawl/openclaw/mcporter/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcporter

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates the installation of the mcporter package from the official Node.js package registry (npm).
  • Evidence: The YAML frontmatter specifies an installation step for the mcporter package using the node package manager.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI tool provides a mechanism to execute arbitrary local shell commands when configured to use stdio-based MCP servers.
  • Evidence: The documentation provides an example command: mcporter call --stdio "bun run ./server.ts" scrape url=https://example.com, which directly executes local scripts.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to ingest and process outputs from external MCP servers, it is susceptible to indirect prompt injection if those servers return malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned from local stdio tools or remote HTTP tools via mcporter call (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are defined in the skill instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (via stdio), network communication (via HTTP), and file configuration management (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not specify sanitization or validation of the content returned by tools before it is processed by the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes functionality to generate new CLI tools and TypeScript client/type definitions based on remote server schemas.
  • Evidence: Commands such as mcporter generate-cli and mcporter emit-ts facilitate the creation of executable code or configurations at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:53 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mcporter