research-codebase

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands and CLI tools, including git (for metadata), date, basename, gh (GitHub CLI), and bunx to run @playwright/cli.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a template for research documents that uses the !command syntax (e.g., !date..., `!`git...). If the execution environment evaluates these markers upon file creation or subsequent reading, it allows for dynamic shell command execution within the generated files.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses curl and playwright-cli to fetch data from arbitrary external URLs provided in the research query or discovered during codebase analysis, including searching for llms.txt and markdown versions of documentation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: External web content fetched via curl/playwright-cli and local codebase files read via readFile (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore instructions" wrappers for the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its sub-agents have capabilities for file reading (readFile), network access (curl/playwright), file writing (TodoWrite), and spawning additional task agents.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the content fetched from the web or read from the codebase before it is processed by the LLM for synthesis.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While intended for research, the capability to read any file in the codebase (readFile without limits) combined with the ability to perform network operations (curl) creates a standard pattern for potential data exfiltration if the agent is misled by malicious data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 10:59 PM