cyber-defense-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes external log data that could contain malicious instructions for the LLM.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the pipeline via the 'log_path' argument specified in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions for sub-agents like the 'log-ingestor' and 'anomaly-detector' do not define clear delimiters or include warnings to ignore instructions found within the logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages file system operations (read/write) and uses the Agent tool to spawn multiple sub-processes.
- Sanitization: There is no sanitization or validation logic to filter out potential prompt injection payloads from the log contents before they are processed by the agents.
Audit Metadata