hydra-head-operator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill implements command-dispatch: tool with command-arg-mode: raw in its metadata. This configuration causes the agent to forward user-provided arguments directly to the shell without model mediation or safety filtering. While intended for an 'operator' persona, this bypasses standard LLM reasoning layers.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The script scripts/hydra-node.sh utilizes docker run to pull and execute the ghcr.io/cardano-scaling/hydra-node image. Since the cardano-scaling organization is not on the predefined trusted list, this is classified as an external dependency download and execution at runtime.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect injection because it ingests data from external API endpoints and local files which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: API outputs from scripts/hydra-api.sh and file contents via the Read tool.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no clear delimiters are used to separate data from instructions in the shell output.
  • Capability inventory: Permission to execute Bash (curl, docker, hydra-node) and Write files.
  • Sanitization: None; external responses are returned directly to the agent context.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (SAFE): Although the skill handles sensitive Cardano and Hydra private keys (.sk files), the analysis did not find any patterns suggesting these keys are transmitted to non-whitelisted external domains. Network activity is limited to local API ports and the specified Docker registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:13 PM