bio-foundation-housekeeping
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): Documentation in
docs/pixi.mdanddocs/duckdb.mdencourages high-risk installation patterns where remote scripts are piped directly intobash,sh, or PowerShelliex. This execution model prevents prior security inspection of the code before it runs on the system. Evidence:curl -fsSL https://pixi.sh/install.sh | bashandcurl https://install.duckdb.org | sh. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill references downloads from
pixi.shandduckdb.org. These domains are not included in the predefined Trusted External Sources list, which elevates the risk for remote script execution findings. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): Main instructions involve complex tool initialization and task execution (
pixi run,linkml generate,duckdb) that perform extensive file system and environment modifications based on project configurations. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting user-defined metadata schema requirements to generate executable Pydantic models and database structures. 1. Ingestion points: Metadata requirements via
SKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent from the input process. 3. Capability inventory:pixi,linkml,duckdb(sub-process spawning and file writing). 4. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is mentioned for the input requirements before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata