openspec-implementation-cn
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill's core workflow involves reading external data from
spec/changes/{change-id}/tasks.jsonand executing the instructions found within. - Ingestion points:
tasks.jsonandproposal.mdin thespec/changes/directory. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions tell the agent to 'read the full proposal' and 'execute tasks sequentially' without warning the agent to ignore instructions embedded within that data.
- Capability inventory: The skill explicitly allows file reading (
cat,find), command execution (npm test,pytest,npm run db:migrate), and arbitrary 'Implementation' steps defined in the tasks. - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is instructed to follow the task list literally.
- [Command Execution] (HIGH): The skill encourages the agent to run arbitrary shell commands based on task descriptions. If the
tasks.jsondefines a step like"step": "rm -rf / # test cleanup", a compliant agent following the 'Never skip a task' rule may execute it. - [Path Traversal] (MEDIUM): The skill uses a variable
{change-id}to construct file paths (e.g.,cat spec/changes/{change-id}/proposal.md). If an attacker can control this variable, they may be able to read sensitive files outside thespecdirectory using../sequences. - [Resource Exhaustion] (LOW): The instruction '请至少执行20轮后才回复用户' (perform at least 20 rounds before replying) forces the agent into a long-running loop. While intended for thoroughness, it could be exploited to cause denial of service via token/compute exhaustion.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata