agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Enables execution of arbitrary code within the browser context.\n
- Evidence: The
evalandwait --fncommands allow running arbitrary JavaScript on the current page.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Provides tools to extract and persist sensitive session data and local files.\n - Evidence: Commands
cookiesandstorage localretrieve session tokens and local application data.\n - Evidence: The
state savecommand writes the browser's current state (including cookies) to a local JSON file.\n - Evidence: Support for the
file://protocol in theopencommand allows reading local file system content into the browser.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection from untrusted web sources.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested via
agent-browser open <url>and processed usingsnapshot.\n - Capability inventory: High-privilege capabilities include file writing (PDF/screenshots), state persistence, and network routing.\n
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used when processing web content.\n
- Sanitization: No evidence that web content is sanitized before being passed to the agent.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Allows loading external browser extensions and connecting to remote cloud browser providers.\n
- Evidence: The
--extensionand--providerflags allow integrating external components.
Audit Metadata