commit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bash(git:*)tool to execute git commands, includinggit diff,git diff --cached,git add, andgit commit. Access is scoped specifically to the git binary. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from the repository's code changes and uses it to drive editing decisions and message generation.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
git diffandgit diff --cachedin Phase 2. - Boundary markers: The workflow prompt lacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) to separate the untrusted diff content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
EditandWritecapabilities in Phase 3 to modify files based on its analysis of the diff, andBashcapabilities in Phase 4 to finalize changes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from the file system before it is processed by the model.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads
.claude/git.local.mdfor configuration. This is a local configuration file for the agent and does not inherently expose sensitive system credentials.
Audit Metadata