init-config
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive user identity information by running
git config user.nameandgit config user.emailin Phase 2. This data is stored and subsequently used as command-line arguments for a local script. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform system discovery and execute a local renderer script. Specifically, it executesgit configand${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/render-claude-config.shwith various dynamically generated arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data that flows into a shell execution context.
- Ingestion points: Developer identity strings from
git config(Phase 2) and user-provided selections fromAskUserQuestion(Phases 3, 4, and 6). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to sanitize the data or warn it about potentially malicious content embedded in the git configuration or user responses.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Bash(*)capabilities used inSKILL.mdto run the discovery and the final renderer script. - Sanitization: Absent. The collected variables are interpolated directly into a shell command string in Phase 7 (
--developer-name,--developer-email, etc.), which could lead to argument injection or command execution if the input contains shell metacharacters.
Audit Metadata