open-prose
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Credentials Unsafe / Data Exfiltration] (HIGH): Multiple core scripts (e.g.,
common/beacon.prose,common/publisher.prose,common/sentinel.prose,common/arbiter.prose) explicitly prompt the user foremail:passwordcredentials and transmit them tohttps://api-v2.prose.md. Transmitting raw credentials to a non-whitelisted third-party domain is a significant security risk. - [Command Execution] (HIGH): The skill extensively utilizes the
bash: allowpermission across various workflows (e.g.,lib/vm-improver.prose,examples/33-pr-review-autofix.prose,examples/35-feature-factory.prose). This allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands includinggit,curl,npm, andgh, providing a large attack surface for system-level exploitation. - [Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): The framework supports a modular import system (e.g.,
examples/11-skills-and-imports.prose) that fetches logic from external sources likegithub:example/code-reviewandnpm:@example/summarizer. While some sources likeanthropic/skillsare trusted, the mechanism facilitates the loading and execution of unverifiable remote scripts from arbitrary repositories. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill possesses a substantial attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to process untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Inputs such as
bug_reportinbug-hunter.prose,pr_diffinpr-review-autofix.prose, andthreadinworkflow-crystallizer.proseingest data from potentially adversarial sources. - Boundary markers: The system relies on simple triple-quote delimiters (
""") which are insufficient to prevent a sophisticated attacker from breaking out of the context and influencing the 'VM' (the agent) or subagents. - Capability inventory: The framework has high-privilege capabilities including filesystem write access, network operations, and shell command execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated escaping or sanitization of external content before it is interpolated into prompts or executed as part of the DSL.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata