skills/frankxai/arcanea/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external .docx files and converts them to markdown or raw XML, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a document could attempt to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: document content is ingested via ooxml/scripts/unpack.py and the Document class in scripts/document.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not currently employ explicit delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when presenting extracted text to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the local filesystem and execute system commands (e.g., pandoc, soffice).
  • Sanitization: While the skill lacks NL-level sanitization, it rigorously uses defusedxml to sanitize the XML parsing layer, effectively mitigating technical injection attacks like XXE (XML External Entity).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several system utilities to perform document processing tasks.
  • Trusted Tools: Uses pandoc, soffice (LibreOffice), pdftoppm, and git via subprocess.run with argument lists, which prevents shell injection.
  • Extraction: Uses zipfile.extractall in ooxml/scripts/unpack.py to extract document contents. While extractall can be sensitive to directory traversal (ZipSlip) in some environments, it is used here within the local workspace for the skill's primary purpose.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external dependencies required for its primary operations.
  • Dependencies: Requires the installation of pandoc, LibreOffice, poppler-utils, and the docx NPM package. These are well-known, industry-standard tools and are treated as safe, trusted sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 10:52 AM