vibe-coding
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes arbitrary shell commands defined in a repository's manifest file, allowing external repository content to execute code on the host system.
- Evidence: In
scripts/vibe.js, thecmdPreviewStartfunction reads thepreview.commandproperty from a tracked.vibe.jsonfile. - Evidence: This command is passed to
startBackground, which executes it usingbash -lc, providing a direct path for repository-controlled code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI tool performs sensitive system modifications and executes background processes.
- Evidence:
cmdSetupmodifies thecore.hooksPathgit configuration to point to.githooks, which can be used to execute arbitrary scripts tracked in the repository during git operations. - Evidence:
startBackgrounduseschild_process.spawnto run commands in a detached shell with redirected output to log files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the repo manifest file.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/vibe.jsreads configuration from.vibe.jsonusing theloadManifestfunction. - Boundary markers: None. The command string is loaded and used without delimiters or warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands via
spawn, modify git configurations, and open network tunnels viangrok. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the command string before shell execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and interacts with external network tunneling services.
- Evidence:
scripts/vibe.jschecks for the presence ofngrokand executes it to create public URLs for local services.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata