canghe-markdown-to-html
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/md/utils/languages.tsuses dynamicimport()to fetch and execute JavaScript language packages from a remote CDN (cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The main entry point
scripts/main.tsusesspawnSyncto run a secondary render script vianpxandbun, which can be exploited if path parameters are manipulated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
downloadFilefunction inscripts/main.tsretrieves images from arbitrary external URLs found in the markdown input, which could facilitate SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/md/extensions/infographic.tsattempts to dynamically import the@antv/infographicpackage, which is not declared in the skill'spackage.jsonmanifest. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill processes untrusted markdown content into HTML output. Ingestion points: Markdown file path provided via command-line arguments. Boundary markers: None; the entire file content is parsed. Capability inventory: Command execution via
spawnSync, file system operations (fs.writeFileSync), and network requests viahttps.get/http.get. Sanitization: Uses themarkedlibrary for parsing but does not implement strict content security policies for generated HTML.
Audit Metadata