requesting-code-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
code-reviewer.mdcontains shell commands that interpolate user-provided placeholders directly:git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}andgit diff {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}. If the values provided for{BASE_SHA}or{HEAD_SHA}contain shell metacharacters such as semicolons, pipes, or backticks, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection as it processes untrusted data without proper isolation.
- Ingestion points: The subagent ingests untrusted content through the
{DESCRIPTION},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED}placeholders, as well as the source code content returned by thegit diffcommand. - Boundary markers: The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate does not use XML tags, triple quotes, or specific delimiters to separate user-provided content from the agent's instructions, nor does it include warnings to ignore instructions found within the reviewed code. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute git commands and provide assessments that dictate the progress of the development workflow.
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the data before it is interpolated into the prompt or used in shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata