coding-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly promotes the use of the --yolo flag for the Codex CLI, which is described as disabling the sandbox and all manual approvals. This encourages the execution of unvetted code with high autonomy.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bash tool definition includes an elevated parameter which, when set to true, allows the command to run on the host system instead of within a sandbox, facilitating privilege escalation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install a third-party package @mariozechner/pi-coding-agent from the NPM registry. This package originates from an unverified external source.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: Use of git clone and gh pr checkout to pull external, potentially attacker-controlled code into the active workspace for analysis and refactoring.
  • Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agents to distinguish between skill instructions and the external data being processed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the bash tool with pty:true and background:true permissions, allowing for broad file system access and shell command execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation steps are performed on the external code before it is passed to the LLM agents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 02:37 AM