skill-registry

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting data from external files that may be attacker-controlled.
  • Ingestion points: Scans and reads content from SKILL.md files (first 10 lines) and project-level convention files like agents.md, CLAUDE.md, and .cursorrules.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are defined to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the scanned content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes to .atl/skill-registry.md, modifies the project's .gitignore file, and uses a mem_save tool to persist data.
  • Sanitization: Extracted content like triggers and descriptions is interpolated directly into the registry markdown without validation or escaping.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans multiple hidden application configuration directories in the user's home folder, specifically targeting ~/.claude/skills/, ~/.config/opencode/skills/, ~/.gemini/skills/, ~/.cursor/skills/, and ~/.copilot/skills/. While targeted at skill subdirectories, this involves traversing sensitive application configuration paths.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes logic to automatically modify the project's .gitignore file if it exists, which constitutes an automated modification of project configuration and directory visibility.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 03:39 AM