skill-registry
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting data from external files that may be attacker-controlled.
- Ingestion points: Scans and reads content from
SKILL.mdfiles (first 10 lines) and project-level convention files likeagents.md,CLAUDE.md, and.cursorrules. - Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are defined to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the scanned content.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes to
.atl/skill-registry.md, modifies the project's.gitignorefile, and uses amem_savetool to persist data. - Sanitization: Extracted content like triggers and descriptions is interpolated directly into the registry markdown without validation or escaping.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans multiple hidden application configuration directories in the user's home folder, specifically targeting
~/.claude/skills/,~/.config/opencode/skills/,~/.gemini/skills/,~/.cursor/skills/, and~/.copilot/skills/. While targeted at skill subdirectories, this involves traversing sensitive application configuration paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes logic to automatically modify the project's
.gitignorefile if it exists, which constitutes an automated modification of project configuration and directory visibility.
Audit Metadata