skills/getpaseo/paseo/paseo-loop/Gen Agent Trust Hub

paseo-loop

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script bin/loop.sh invokes the paseo CLI using flags --mode bypassPermissions for Claude agents and --mode full-access for Codex agents. These flags explicitly attempt to bypass safety, filtering, and permission controls within the agent runtime environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the feedback loop. The output from a previous iteration (stored in last_reason_file) is interpolated directly into the worker prompt for the next iteration. If an agent produces malicious output, it can hijack the instructions of subsequent iterations. Ingestion points: last_reason_file. Boundary markers: <previous-iteration-result> tags. Capability inventory: paseo run (arbitrary agent actions), file system writes, and git operations. Sanitization: None detected for interpolated content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Live Steering' mechanism re-reads worker-prompt.md and verifier-prompt.md from the filesystem (~/.paseo/loops/) at the start of every iteration. This allows for dynamic modification of the instructions being executed by the agents while the loop is active.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script performs filesystem management and git worktree operations based on user-provided arguments, creating state directories and managing branch checkouts without explicit validation of the provided names or paths.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 02:09 PM