paseo-loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
bin/loop.shinvokes thepaseoCLI using flags--mode bypassPermissionsfor Claude agents and--mode full-accessfor Codex agents. These flags explicitly attempt to bypass safety, filtering, and permission controls within the agent runtime environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the feedback loop. The output from a previous iteration (stored in
last_reason_file) is interpolated directly into the worker prompt for the next iteration. If an agent produces malicious output, it can hijack the instructions of subsequent iterations. Ingestion points:last_reason_file. Boundary markers:<previous-iteration-result>tags. Capability inventory:paseo run(arbitrary agent actions), file system writes, and git operations. Sanitization: None detected for interpolated content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Live Steering' mechanism re-reads
worker-prompt.mdandverifier-prompt.mdfrom the filesystem (~/.paseo/loops/) at the start of every iteration. This allows for dynamic modification of the instructions being executed by the agents while the loop is active. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script performs filesystem management and git worktree operations based on user-provided arguments, creating state directories and managing branch checkouts without explicit validation of the provided names or paths.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata