paseo-orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes shell commands using variables like <task-slug> (e.g., cat ~/.paseo/plans/<task-slug>.md). If these identifiers are derived from user-supplied task descriptions without robust sanitization, it could lead to directory traversal or command injection when interpreted by the shell.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources to influence its orchestration logic and the prompts it sends to sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads user input from $ARGUMENTS, activity logs from sub-agents via the get agent activity tool, and implementation plans stored in the ~/.paseo/plans/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used when interpolating external content or agent findings into subsequent prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including the ability to launch agents (create agent), send instructions to them (send agent prompt), schedule recurring tasks (create schedule), and execute arbitrary shell commands (Bash tool).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content gathered from sub-agents before it is integrated into the orchestrator's decision-making process or passed to other agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 24, 2026, 09:29 AM