sentry-setup-ai-monitoring

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] BENIGN: The fragment is a legitimate guidance and automation piece for enabling Sentry AI Agent Monitoring across common AI SDKs, with a detection-first approach, standard install/config patterns, and explicit privacy controls. Data flows are described and aligned with the stated purpose. Privacy considerations are appropriately surfaced, and there are no evident backdoors or exfiltration patterns observed. LLM verification: This code/text is an instrumentation guide to enable Sentry AI monitoring; it does not contain classic malware indicators. The highest risk is privacy and over-collection: examples encourage enabling full input/output capture and full tracing, which can exfiltrate sensitive prompts/outputs to Sentry if user DSN is configured. There are also supply-chain hygiene concerns from recommending unpinned/upstream install commands. Recommend treating recordInputs/recordOutputs as opt-in, defaulting to of