lint-fix
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided arguments
$0(rule name) and$1(glob pattern) directly into shell commands. For example,pnpm exec eslint --rule '@sentry/scraps/$0: error' "$1"is used to count and fix violations. This presents a risk of command injection if the input is not sanitized, as shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|, or backticks) could be used to execute arbitrary commands. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: For large-scale rollouts exceeding 500 violations, the skill suggests that the agent write and execute temporary codemods or scripts using
jscodeshiftor@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree. This involves the runtime generation and execution of code logic, which can be an attack vector if the script generation is influenced by malicious input. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves reading and modifying source code files. This creates an ingestion surface where a malicious file in the codebase could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the linting and fixing process.
- Ingestion points: Source files matching the glob pattern provided in the
$1argument are read by the agent (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings are used when processing the content of these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
eslint,prek) and perform filesystem writes (applying lint fixes) across the codebase. - Sanitization: The skill instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of the file content before the agent attempts to process and fix violations.
Audit Metadata