NYC
skills/getsentry/warden/warden-skill/Gen Agent Trust Hub

warden-skill

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill provides functionality to fetch and install 'Remote Skills' from external repositories (e.g., warden add --remote getsentry/skills). Since these repositories are not part of the trusted source whitelist, this introduces an unverified third-party dependency chain.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): According to the documentation, custom and remote skills are granted access to a toolset that includes Bash, Write, and Edit. This allows downloaded remote scripts to execute arbitrary code or commands on the host machine.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill provides the agent with a Bash tool and a --fix option for auto-applying changes. This creates a dangerous surface for indirect prompt injection: if the agent analyzes a malicious file containing instructions to misuse these tools, it could compromise the host environment.
  • Ingestion points: Local files and git diffs (e.g., warden src/auth.ts).
  • Boundary markers: Absent.
  • Capability inventory: Bash, Write, Edit, WebFetch, WebSearch (File: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (LOW): The documentation provides an example command to export an API key (export WARDEN_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...). While the value provided is a placeholder, this pattern encourages users to store sensitive credentials in plain-text shell history.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:31 AM