warden-sweep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system commands to perform its core functions.
scripts/scan.pyruns thewardentool andgitfor repository analysis.scripts/create_issue.py,scripts/index_prs.py, andscripts/organize.pyuse theghCLI tool to interact with GitHub for creating issues, listing pull requests, and managing labels.SKILL.mdalso orchestrates repository modifications usinggit worktreeandgit pushduring the patching phase. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with GitHub's official services using the
ghCLI to fetch pull request metadata and diffs. These operations target a well-known service and are documented as standard behavior for the skill's purpose. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted code from the repository being scanned and incorporates finding data into instructions for subsequent subagent tasks.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/scan.pyenumerates repository files, thewardentool reads their content, andscripts/index_prs.pyfetches existing pull request data from GitHub. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompts defined in
SKILL.mdfor Phase 2 (Verify) and Phase 4 (Patch) use structured Markdown headers (e.g., '## Finding', '## Instructions') to separate analysis data from agent instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including the ability to run arbitrary system commands via
subprocess.run(git, gh, warden) across multiple scripts, and the ability to modify repository code and create pull requests. - Sanitization: The skill does not appear to perform explicit sanitization or escaping of the content found in repository files or analysis findings before interpolating them into the templates used to prompt subagents.
Audit Metadata