ai-multimodal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/session_brief.pyreads local conversation logs from~/.claude/projects/and transmits them to external LLM providers (Google Gemini or Anthropic via CLI) to generate summaries. Past conversations may contain sensitive data or credentials. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several system binaries usingsubprocess.run. \n scripts/media_optimizer.pyexecutesffmpegandffprobeto validate and compress media files. \nscripts/gemini_tts.pyattempts to play audio through system players likempv,paplay,aplay, orffplay. \nscripts/session_brief.pycalls theclaudeandgeminiCLI tools for summarization andedge-ttsfor speech synthesis. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill faces risk from indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted multimedia content. \n- Ingestion points:
scripts/gemini_batch_process.py,scripts/document_converter.py, andscripts/media_optimizer.pyprocess external audio, video, image, and PDF files. \n - Boundary markers: None. Prompts lack delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within the media content. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute system commands and read local files, which increases the impact of a successful injection. \n
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on content extracted from media before it is sent to the model.
Audit Metadata