copilot-spaces
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through data ingested from external "Copilot Spaces".
- Ingestion points: The
mcp__github__get_copilot_spacetool retrieves full context, including documentation, code, and "custom instructions" from remote repositories or shared collections (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or isolation protocols are identified. The skill documentation explicitly instructs the agent to "treat these [space content] as directives, not suggestions," which significantly increases the risk that malicious instructions embedded in a space will be executed by the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to perform write operations (create, update, delete) on GitHub resources via
gh apiand access external repositories and issues using other MCP tools. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the ingested space content or instructions is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
gh apicommand-line tool to perform management tasks. It provides instructions for users to grant broader permissions to the GitHub CLI usinggh auth refresh -h github.com -s userto facilitate write operations such as creating or deleting spaces.
Audit Metadata