flowstudio-power-automate-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external Power Automate environments which could contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: The tools
get_live_flow,get_live_flow_run_action_outputs, andget_live_flow_runs(found inSKILL.mdandreferences/tool-reference.md) retrieve JSON-formatted definitions and outputs from the FlowStudio server. - Boundary markers: The provided documentation and code helpers do not suggest the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate this external data from the agent's primary system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify flow logic (
update_live_flow), trigger executions (trigger_live_flow), and cancel runs (cancel_live_flow_run), providing a path for an injection to result in unauthorized actions. - Sanitization: The skill performs standard JSON parsing via
json.loadsorJSON.parsebut does not implement content validation or sanitization to detect embedded instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to an external API endpoint to manage Power Automate resources.
- The Python and Node.js helpers in
SKILL.mdconnect tohttps://mcp.flowstudio.app/mcpusing thex-api-keyheader for authentication. - These connections are used to fetch tool metadata and execute cloud flow operations.
Audit Metadata