claude-md-management
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): In
references/quality-criteria.md, the instructions tell the agent to 'Run documented commands (mentally or actually)' to verify their validity. Because the skill allows theBashtool, an agent might attempt to execute arbitrary and potentially malicious code found in aCLAUDE.mdfile during the assessment phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from
CLAUDE.mdfiles which can control the agent's output and actions. - Ingestion points: The
findcommand andReadtool are used to locate and ingestCLAUDE.md,.claude.md, and.claude.local.mdfiles (SKILL.md, Phase 1). - Boundary markers: None are specified; the agent processes the file content directly for scoring.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
BashandEdittools, allowing for command execution and file modification based on the untrusted input. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content within
CLAUDE.mdis performed before processing. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The 'Discovery' phase in
SKILL.mdexplicitly directs the agent to search for and read~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. Accessing files in the user's home directory outside of the current project workspace is a privacy concern and increases the risk of sensitive data exposure.
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