copilot-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of the
copilotCLI tool with broad administrative and filesystem permissions. Specifically, it encourages the use of flags such as--allow-all-tools,--allow-all-paths, and--yolo(as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/cli-command-reference.md), which grant the underlying model the ability to perform unconstrained actions on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by forwarding untrusted data to a secondary AI model with high execution privileges.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via user-provided task descriptions and project file contents as specified in the prompt template in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks effective boundary markers or safety instructions to prevent the delegated model from interpreting data within the 'Task' or 'Context' fields as direct commands.
- Capability inventory: The delegated
copilotCLI possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution and filesystem access, particularly when combined with the suggested permission flags. - Sanitization: No mechanisms are described for sanitizing or escaping external content before it is interpolated into the CLI command prompt.
Audit Metadata