gemini

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands using strings derived from user input. In SKILL.md, the instruction gemini -p "<english-prompt>" suggests direct interpolation of a prompt into a bash command. Without strict escaping of shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipes), a malicious user prompt could result in arbitrary command execution on the local host.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: External data, such as codebase content and documentation, is ingested and passed to the Gemini CLI as part of an English prompt (see SKILL.md Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: The skill suggests using English formulations and specific execution flags like --approval-mode plan to scope the task, but lacks formal structural sanitization or delimiters for the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses Bash, Read, and Write capabilities. If the downstream model's output is manipulated via injected instructions in the processed files, it could lead to unauthorized file modifications or command execution.
  • Sanitization: The skill mandates that output be treated as untrusted and requires user confirmation for destructive commands, which serves as a critical human-in-the-loop mitigation.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on and references the gemini CLI tool. As this is a well-known technology service, the reference is documented neutrally. The skill includes a prerequisite check (gemini --version) to ensure the tool is present locally before attempting delegation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 07:59 PM