langchain4j-spring-boot-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines several AI service interfaces (e.g.,
CustomerSupportAssistantandRagAssistantinSKILL.md) that interpolate untrusted user input directly into prompt templates using placeholders like{{customerMessage}}or{{question}}. Without explicit boundary markers (like XML tags or triple quotes) or input sanitization, malicious user input could potentially attempt to override system instructions. This is particularly relevant as the agent environment is granted powerful tools. - Ingestion points: Method parameters in interfaces annotated with
@AiServicefound inSKILL.mdandreferences/examples.md(e.g.,handleInquiry(String customerMessage)). - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the variables.
- Capability inventory: According to the
SKILL.mdfrontmatter, the agent has access toBash,Write,Edit,Read,Glob, andGreptools. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is included in the tutorial code snippets.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration explicitly allows the use of the
Bashtool. This is expected for a development-focused skill that handles Spring Boot integration, build processes, and testing, but it increases the impact if a prompt injection occurs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions guide the user to include external dependencies such as
dev.langchain4j:langchain4j-spring-boot-starteranddev.langchain4j:langchain4j-open-ai-spring-boot-starter. These are legitimate, well-known libraries from the LangChain4j project, used according to standard Java development practices.
Audit Metadata