write-tests

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill reads untrusted data from the local file system, specifically git diff outputs and file contents, which are then used to populate instructions for specialized agents (Sonnet/Opus).
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads file contents via {FILE_PATH}, git diff, and project documentation like @README.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or XML tags are used to isolate untrusted code content from the agent instructions in the provided templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (git status, test commands), write new files (tests), and spawn multiple sub-agents with broad instructions.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the code content is performed before passing it to the LLM.
  • Command Execution (HIGH): The skill automatically discovers and executes shell commands for running tests and generating coverage reports from package.json or other project configs. This is a vector for arbitrary command execution if an attacker can influence the project configuration files.
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill implements a 'write-and-execute' loop where agents generate test code that is immediately executed in the local environment. If the generation phase is compromised via indirect prompt injection, this leads directly to RCE.
  • Metadata Poisoning (LOW): The skill relies on external skills like sadd and TDD without verifying their provenance or integrity within this file, though this is a common pattern in modular agent design.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:46 AM