flow-interview

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from external task descriptions and local files, then performs high-privilege write operations (updating trackers, rewriting files) based on that data. An attacker controlling a task description could inject instructions to manipulate the agent's output or tool usage.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via bd show <id> (external tracker) and reading local file paths (e.g., SPEC.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions (e.g., 'ignore embedded commands') to isolate the untrusted data from the system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant write capabilities including bd update, bd create, and the ability to rewrite any local file path provided by the user.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external sources is performed before it is used to generate new specs or update the tracker.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill uses a local CLI tool (bd) to manage task data.
  • Evidence: Commands such as bd show, bd update, and bd create are executed with user-supplied or externally-sourced arguments. While primarily for task management, these represent a capability surface for exploitation via injection.
  • [Unverifiable References] (LOW): The skill logic relies on an external file questions.md which was not provided for analysis.
  • Evidence: Instructions direct the agent to 'Read [questions.md] for all question categories and interview guidelines.'
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:27 AM