resend-integration-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The
scripts/setup-resend-mcp.shscript clones a repository fromhttps://github.com/resend/mcp-send-email.git. This source is not in the predefined trusted list, meaning the agent is downloading arbitrary third-party code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The setup script automatically runs
npm installandnpm run buildon the contents of the cloned repository. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the host machine during the installation phase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on running a locally compiled Node.js server via
node build/index.js, which provides the core MCP functionality and tools. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH):
- Evidence (Indirect Prompt Injection): In
references/EXAMPLES.md, multiple patterns (Examples 3, 9, 11) demonstrate the agent reading untrusted data sources likecustomers.csvandsubscribers.jsonto generate and send emails. - Ingestion Points:
customers.csv,subscribers.json,email.md. - Capability Inventory:
send_email,schedule_email,send_broadcast_email. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or delimiters) are provided or recommended in the instructions to separate data from instructions.
- Risk: An attacker could place malicious instructions inside a CSV or JSON file that, when read by the agent, triggers the exfiltration of sensitive local files (e.g.,
.env, SSH keys) by sending them to an attacker-controlled email address. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (MEDIUM): The automated setup script prompts for a
RESEND_API_KEYand echoes it back into the terminal session while generating configuration snippets. This exposes the secret to terminal history, shoulder surfing, and potential logging systems.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata