gitlab-release
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The command
glab release upload <tag> <file>provides a direct mechanism to send local files to a remote server. While intended for legitimate assets, it can be abused to exfiltrate sensitive files such as~/.ssh/id_rsa,.env, or cloud credentials if the agent is coerced through prompt injection or malicious instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executeglabcommands. The risk is minimized as it uses a standard CLI tool, but it relies on proper parameter sanitization which is not explicitly defined in the skill logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from GitLab (release notes, tag names) which could contain hidden instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points:
glab release view <tag>,glab release list. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent processes the command output directly without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: File reading, network upload (via
glab), and release deletion. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to filter or escape the contents of release notes or descriptions before they enter the agent's context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata