configuring-claude-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references a Claude Code installation command that fetches a script from
https://claude.ai/install.shand pipes it directly into a bash shell. This source is recognized as the official domain for Anthropic, a trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages several bash-based hooks and wrapper scripts. Specifically, the
wrap-git-with-nix-develop.shscript intercepts bash tool execution to wrap commands in a specific development environment. Additionally, various notification hooks (stop-notification.sh,ask-notification.sh, etc.) executecurlcommands to send data to the Pushover notification service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The implementation of
PreToolUsehooks creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted tool inputs. \n - Ingestion points: The hooks ingest data from
tool_input.commandas documented inreferences/troubleshooting.md. \n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided hook scripts. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the ability to modify tool inputs via the
updatedInputfield and authorize execution withpermissionDecision: \"allow\". \n - Sanitization: While the scripts use
jqand Base64 encoding for shell-level safety and JSON formatting, they do not perform logical sanitization of the commands to prevent malicious instructions embedded within strings.
Audit Metadata