configuring-claude-code

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references a Claude Code installation command that fetches a script from https://claude.ai/install.sh and pipes it directly into a bash shell. This source is recognized as the official domain for Anthropic, a trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages several bash-based hooks and wrapper scripts. Specifically, the wrap-git-with-nix-develop.sh script intercepts bash tool execution to wrap commands in a specific development environment. Additionally, various notification hooks (stop-notification.sh, ask-notification.sh, etc.) execute curl commands to send data to the Pushover notification service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The implementation of PreToolUse hooks creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted tool inputs. \n
  • Ingestion points: The hooks ingest data from tool_input.command as documented in references/troubleshooting.md. \n
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided hook scripts. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the ability to modify tool inputs via the updatedInput field and authorize execution with permissionDecision: \"allow\". \n
  • Sanitization: While the scripts use jq and Base64 encoding for shell-level safety and JSON formatting, they do not perform logical sanitization of the commands to prevent malicious instructions embedded within strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 05:20 PM