token-hygiene
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence mechanism established via macOS launchd agent (
com.claude.schedule.token-hygiene.plist) to execute a local shell script monthly. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The automated script
token-hygiene.shinvokes theclaudeCLI with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, bypassing interactive security confirmations for tool usage. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Grants the automated agent access to the
Bashtool, enabling arbitrary command execution without user oversight during the scheduled audit. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Contains optional logic to transmit audit data (file metrics and project structure) to an external email address using the
gogCLI tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The script
token-hygiene.shreads content frommemory/token-hygiene-tracker.jsonand directory listings ($TOPIC_FILES) and interpolates them into the Claude prompt. - Boundary markers: No clear delimiters are used to separate untrusted file content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Bash,Write, andEditpermissions. - Sanitization: Input from local files is not sanitized before being passed to the LLM.
Audit Metadata