mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The
scripts/connections.pyfile implements astdiotransport layer that executes local commands and arguments viastdio_client. This provides a mechanism for local subprocess execution which, while functional for MCP servers, lacks input sanitization if parameters are derived from untrusted sources. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The
SKILL.mdinstructions direct the agent to fetch documentation and SDK READMEs from themodelcontextprotocolGitHub organization and website viaWebFetch. As this organization is not on the provided trusted list, these fetches are classified as unverified external downloads of instructions. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill recommends using
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspectorfor testing. Thenpxcommand downloads and executes third-party packages from the npm registry at runtime, which bypasses static security checks of the skill's local files. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external data.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdusesWebFetchto load content frommodelcontextprotocol.ioandraw.githubusercontent.com. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is instructed to load external resources directly into its context.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
stdiotransport inconnections.pyand package execution vianpxinSKILL.md(Phase 3.2). - Sanitization: None. The skill does not implement validation or escaping for external content before interpolation.
Audit Metadata