report-generator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk attack surface where untrusted data from external files is ingested and used to generate output files with side effects.
- Ingestion points: The
generateandweeklycommands inscripts/main.py(lines 32, 34, 57) read data from user-supplied JSON and CSV files. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when processing the data content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (
Path(output).write_text(html)inmain.py). If used within an agent pipeline, the resulting HTML could influence downstream agent decisions. - Sanitization: Completely absent. The functions
generate_report_htmlandgenerate_weekly_htmluse Python f-strings to interpolate raw data values directly into HTML tags (e.g.,<td>{v}</td>). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML, script tags, or malicious instructions into the report. - Unverifiable Dependencies (LOW): The skill references
weasyprintinSKILL.mdfor PDF generation, which has a complex dependency tree (including system libraries like Pango/GObject), though it is a well-known package. - Metadata Integrity (INFO): The metadata claims the skill uses
jinja2, but the actual implementation inmain.pyuses unsafe f-string concatenation instead of Jinja2's auto-escaping templates, which would have been a safer choice.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata