electrobun-window-management
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata identifies the author as "Blackboard", which contradicts the system-provided author identity of "gyorkluu". This discrepancy in authorship is misleading and could affect the trust assessment of the skill's origin.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its handling of external content and inter-process communication.
- Ingestion points: The implementation of
BrowserView.loadURL()allows the agent to load content from arbitrary external websites. Furthermore, theWindowHubimplementation allows windows to invoke RPC methods on others using strings for method names and arguments. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within loaded pages or RPC messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to create and manipulate windows, write to the local file system (via
Bun.write), and execute RPC handlers. - Sanitization: The provided code examples lack sanitization or validation of the URLs being loaded or the arguments passed through the RPC hub.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The
WindowStateManagerusesBun.writeto store UI state (coordinates and dimensions) in a JSON file within theuserDatadirectory. This is a legitimate and standard practice for desktop applications to maintain user interface persistence across sessions.
Audit Metadata