content-bridge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
install.shscript downloads and executes code from unverified third-party GitHub repositories without version pinning. - Clones
https://github.com/Bwkyd/wexin-read-mcp.gitfor WeChat article extraction. - Installs
notebooklm-pydirectly fromhttps://github.com/teng-lin/notebooklm-py.gitusing pip. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational logic heavily depends on executing local CLI tools via subprocess calls, which can be risky if inputs are not properly sanitized.
- Calls
markitdownfor document to Markdown conversion. - Executes
notebooklmCLI commands for cloud synchronization and generation. - Invokes
bilibili-subtitlefor processing video transcripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high surface area for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from the open web.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via WeChat MCP tools, YouTube transcript extractors, and general web readers.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack clear delimiters or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including file system access (writing to
/tmp/), network operations (uploading to Google), and subprocess execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata