github-project-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script
scripts/implement_issue.pyis vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it fetches GitHub issue titles and bodies and interpolates them directly into a prompt template for the AI agent. - Ingestion points: The skill reads external, potentially attacker-controlled content from GitHub issues via the
scripts/fetch_issue.pyandscripts/implement_issue.pyscripts. - Boundary markers: The generated prompts use standard Markdown headers but lack robust delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched issue content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including system command execution via
subprocess.runfor tools likegh,git,pnpm, andturbo, enabling it to modify the codebase and interact with remote repositories. - Sanitization: The skill performs minimal sanitization; while it uses a
slugifyfunction for branch names, it does not escape or sanitize the issue content incorporated into AI prompts. - Mitigation: The skill design includes a critical 'User Approval Gate' (documented in Phase 4 of the SKILL.md), which requires a human to review the generated implementation plan before the AI agent proceeds with code changes.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes heavy use of
subprocess.runto execute external CLI tools such as the GitHub CLI (gh),git,pnpm, andturbo. While this is necessary for the skill's primary automation purpose, it represents a significant capability surface that requires the agent to operate in a high-trust environment.
Audit Metadata