skills/hanli0705/lead_agent/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Persistence Mechanisms] (HIGH): The script recalc.py modifies the user's global LibreOffice configuration directory (~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/basic/Standard or the macOS equivalent) to install a StarBasic macro (Module1.xba). This modification is permanent and alters the application's behavior beyond the scope of the skill's execution.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted Excel files and processes them using complex parsers (LibreOffice and openpyxl).
  • Ingestion points: The filename argument in recalc.py (via sys.argv[1]).
  • Boundary markers: None detected; the script directly loads and processes the provided file path.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (soffice, timeout, gtimeout) and file system write access (open(macro_file, 'w')).
  • Sanitization: None; the script converts the path to an absolute path but does not validate the file content or safely sandbox the LibreOffice execution.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The script generates executable code (StarBasic macro) at runtime and writes it to the disk before invoking it via subprocess.run. Although the macro content is currently hardcoded, this pattern of script generation and execution increases the attack surface.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The script uses subprocess.run to call system binaries. While it uses argument lists (reducing shell injection risk), it relies on the presence and integrity of external tools like soffice and timeout.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 04:06 AM