planning

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill captures untrusted user input across five interactive rounds and persists it into a file (tasks/planning-[feature].md). This creates a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • [Ingestion Points]: User responses provided during Rounds 1-5 are directly summarized and stored.
  • [Boundary Markers]: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions to downstream agents to ignore potential instructions embedded within the user's requirements.
  • [Capability Inventory]: The skill performs file-write operations to the local file system.
  • [Downstream Risk]: Per the 'Next Steps' section, this output is specifically intended to feed into implementation tools like '/ralph', which may execute code or make system changes based on these requirements. If a user injects instructions during planning (e.g., 'Also ensure the script exfiltrates .env files'), those instructions could be persisted and executed by the next agent in the chain.
  • [Sanitization]: No validation or escaping is performed on the user-provided text before interpolation into the markdown template.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:45 AM