gitops-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The skill contains a command that pipes a remote script into a shell with root privileges. Evidence:
curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bashinSKILL.md. Risk: The domainfluxcd.iois not on the trusted organizations list, making this a high-risk operation if the source is compromised. - [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The skill requires administrative cluster access and encourages the use of
sudofor tool installation. Evidence:sudo bashinSKILL.mdand high-privilegekubectloperations throughout the files. - [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): Kubernetes manifests are downloaded and applied directly from external URLs. Evidence:
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/install.yamlinSKILL.md. Risk: The GitHub organizationargoprojis not in the predefined trusted list. Applying unvetted manifests can lead to unauthorized resource creation or privilege escalation within the cluster. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external Git repositories. Ingestion points:
repoURLandurlparameters inSKILL.mdandreferences/argocd-setup.md. Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: Broad cluster management viakubectl,flux, andargocdtools. Sanitization: Absent; no validation of external repository content before application.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata