find-skills

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill instructions direct the agent to install external code from arbitrary GitHub repositories using npx skills add <owner/repo>. Crucially, it recommends the -y flag, which skips all confirmation prompts and safety warnings, allowing for the silent installation and subsequent execution of potentially malicious scripts.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill facilitates downloading software from an unvetted 'open agent skills ecosystem' (skills.sh). While it mentions some trusted sources like vercel-labs, it also promotes untrusted sources and general keyword searching which can lead to typosquatting or malicious package discovery.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The tool relies on shell command execution for its core functionality. It encourages global installation (-g), which can lead to higher impact if a downloaded skill contains persistence mechanisms or modifies system-wide configurations.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill ingests data from external search results. A malicious actor could publish a skill with a name or description containing instructions designed to hijack the agent's logic when it parses the search output (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Search results from npx skills find.
  • Boundary markers: None; the agent is expected to parse and repeat the results.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (npx), network operations (implicit in npx).
  • Sanitization: None; the skill encourages direct interpolation of search results into the conversation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 02:18 AM